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Levi Kitrossky, 2004

Women@NDS and Women@Synagogue

Foreword

Whether men and women should retain different statuses in the synagogue remains one of the most controversial issues in Jewish life. In this context, the term synagogue may be understood in the limited sense of “house of prayer” or in the broader sense as symbolizing all of Judaism.

While an analysis of the entire length and breadth of this issue in all its historical, legal, and homiletical aspects is well beyond the scope of this paper, we would like to make several points by studying certain passages from the book of Genesis. From Genesis, we will move on the Talmud and some of the later legal writings. We will also draw the comparison implied in the title of this paper and set forth a number of case studies.

From the Beginning

The Tale of Two Verses

The earliest biblical passage that seems to imply an inferior status for women is the following: “…in pain thou shalt bring forth children; and thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee.”1 The nature of this passage is not entirely clear: Is it a command, a prediction, a punishment? What, if any, are its normative implications?

One of the peculiarities of this passage is its use of the word teshukah—desire. The word appears but three times in the Bible, a fact that immediately points us to another passage not far away: “Sin coucheth at the door; and unto thee its desire; but thou mayest rule over it.”2 Here too, the Bible uses the word teshukah, which we translate as desire. But the similarities between the two passages do not stop here. Both passages predicate the subject’s desire to the object:

 

 

Subject

 

Object

Genesis 3:16

Thou (Eve)

=>

desire =>

thy husband

Genesis 4:7

Sin

=>

desire =>

(unto) thee (Cain)

 

And in both cases, it is said that the latter will rule over the former.

These similarities—use of the word teshukah that word’s similar syntactic function in each passage, and the object’s relation to the subject—suggest that there is much to be learned by comparing the two passages (gezerah shavah mufnet). Surprisingly, however, over the generations, such attempts to compare the two have been relatively few. Thus, with so few classical commentators lining up to draw conclusions from these two passages, we take the liberty of searching for, and finding, several messages.

Punishment Not Commandment

First let us consider whether God’s statement to Eve (Genesis 3:16) is a prophecy, a commandment, or a punishment. A look at the context should give us the answer:

 

God’s statement to Adam:

“in toil shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life.”3

God’s statement to Eve:

 “…in pain thou shalt bring forth children”.1

 

Though translated differently in English (in toil, in pain), the two statements use the same Hebrew word—itzavon. Is Adam commanded to eat in toil all of his days? Clearly not. For man is permitted to struggle against this curse. Man is permitted to work to ameliorate the difficulty with which the earth yields its produce. Today, in fact, this curse has largely been overcome. In developed countries, few people are engaged in agriculture, and those who are need not invest the physical toil and suffering of generations gone by. Moreover, when Noah is born, we are informed that Noah will “comfort us in our work and in the toil (itzvon) of our hands.” That is to say that the curse of Adam was overcome or ameliorated.4

In the case of childbirth, women waited much longer for relief in the form of anesthesia. However, no Jewish authority ever claimed that amelioration of birth pangs was forbidden on the basis of Genesis 3:16! And physicians continue to enhance the ease with which children are born. According to personal experience of the author, giving birth is not so painful nowadays.

The main component of Adam’s punishment is death. Nevertheless, Judaism sees avoiding death as a moral obligation. Similarly, we can say that making agriculture easier and freeing woman from oppression are moral duties.

Thus Eve, like Adam, received a punishment that she was not forbidden to overcome. Similarly, the second part of God’s statement to Eve—“thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee”—is not a commandment but rather a punishment, one which she is permitted to overcome, a punishment that, with time may become lighter or disappear completely.

In fact, it appears that certain commentators accepted this interpretation. Two examples: “He will rule over her as a master rules over a slave” (Radak). “She will be forced to give birth by her desire, and if not, her husband will force her” (Hizkuni). It is inconceivable that Radak and Hizkuni construed this as a commandment, for if they did, their explanations would contradict Jewish law and badly miss the ideal. Thus, the statement could not have been obligatory.

We are now prepared to draw some lessons on the basis of the similarities we have noted.

Two Verses’ Equal Cut

Although it seems difficult to imagine that the similarities between the words of the Almighty to Eve and to Cain are accidental, the use of the hermeneutical method called “equal cut” or textual analogy (gezerah shavah) cannot be applied by just anyone. Nevertheless, we remain free to use it in exegesis that is not legally binding (agadah). What, then is Scripture trying to tell us by the similarity between these two verses?

At first glance, one might infer that, since woman and sin occupy the same position in their corresponding verses, woman is comparable to sin. That, of course, would be the unkindest cut of all! But it is very easy to see why such a conclusion is mistaken: What, in essence, is sin in the words addressed to Cain? There is no such thing as sin independent of man. Only the sinner is to blame.5 Thus woman cannot be identified with or compared to sin, and we can rule out this interpretation.

Almost the only classical commentator who paid any attention at all to the similarity of Genesis 3:16 and Genesis 4:7 was Saadiah Gaon. His matter-of-fact observation is that “as a man exercises his power over a woman, so shall he exercise his power over the evil inclination”.6 Such an interpretation might have been appropriate for tenth century Baghdad, but it seems a bit out of step in our time. Another weak point is that the analogy is offered in only one direction, whereas a good “equal cut” should be bidirectional.

So let us begin by modifying Saadiah’s comment. Despite all modern developments, a highly active attitude toward woman remains typical of human males; in the same way, man must take an active stance vis-а-vis the evil inclination and conquer it. That is one direction; now for the other: What is meant when the verse says that sin desires Cain? As mentioned, there is no such beast as a sin that is separate from man! Thus it is Cain’s own desire that he must conquer. That is, when Scripture speaks of Cain’s mind-set, it uses a metaphor that represents it as a separate entity. The evil part of Cain that threatens to overcome his entire personality is represented as some abstract, independent entity called sin—which desires him.

Now let us apply this result to the Genesis 3:16 and ask ourselves, What about man’s desire?7 Using “equal cut” backwards from Cain to Eve, we arrive at the conclusion that although the verse is referring to Eve’s desire, “between the lines,” there is a clear hint that man has no less desire for woman, and that he is responsible for controlling it. The additional meaning of the verse, then, is that, as Cain cannot blame sin, so man cannot blame woman when his behavior toward her is unacceptable. Man must control his desire toward woman (as he must control all his desires) and not blame others.

A man is a free and responsible being. As such, he may not complain that he was seduced, inflamed, or raped by a woman’s appearance. And this fundamental principle is well anchored in modern regulations concerning sexual harassment and similar offenses. A woman’s provocative clothing cannot be used in defense against a charge of harassment.

There must also be a connection between parts of Genesis 3:16 concerning woman’s subservience and desire. We suggest the connection is as follows. Man tends to shift a part of his struggle onto woman and assign her part of the responsibility for controlling his own desire. He therefore formulates modesty laws for her and then uses them to justify woman’s subservient status. This has resulted in numerous aphorisms, such as “All glorious is the king’s daughter within the palace” [understood as an injunction to stay inside the home], “a high position is not good for a woman”, “all women’s wisdom is in the spinning wheel”, 8 or in a more modern way, “les femmes tricotant.”9 We, of course, do not oppose modesty but rather an excessive stress on it as a tool for keeping woman’s social profile low. Nowadays, there are even authorities who, based on a strict interpretation of the laws of modesty, do not permit women to drive!

The proximity of woman’s subservience to desire in Genesis 3:16 gives us another hint of woman’s response to all this. What will woman logically do as she finds herself subservient to man? She will try to exploit man’s sensuality to improve her position. Such a situation—one bordering on pathology—is described very vividly by Lev Tolstoy: “But then do not let man enjoy these rights, while his companion is deprived of them, and finds herself obliged to make use of the coquetry by which she governs, so that the result is that man chooses ‘formally,’ whereas really it is woman who chooses. As soon as she is in possession of her means, she abuses them, and acquires a terrible supremacy.” So says Tolstoy’s hapless hero.10

So we have drawn many lessons from our two passages, including some that were quite unexpected. Briefly, we can list them as follows:

·               Scripture opposes reification of the evil inclination. The evil inclination must be seen as part of us, not a separate entity.

·               Scripture puts responsibility on man himself.

·               There is a connection between desire and oppression of its object.

·               Woman received a punishment but not a commandment. Our moral obligation is to alleviate this punishment.

Now let us turn to later developments and then to modernity.

Through Eons

Eve’s curse resulted in numerous instances of female subservience throughout most civilizations. Nevertheless, we confine ours remarks to the status of women in Jewish society. We will not undertake a thorough analysis of Jewish law on this subject but rather take a fairly superficial look at one particular area—the study of Torah.

The role of women in the study of Torah was determined for many generations by Rabbi Eliezer’s famous maxim, “He who teaches his daughter Torah teaches her folly.”11 The Talmud cites no basis for this dictum. It may well have been just a common view on women as supposedly inferior. After all, only much later was the belief in woman’s inferiority recognized as prejudice.12

Although there were instances of women studying Torah, generally, they were not only exempt but forbidden to learn, especially the oral Torah. From the Talmud, we know of the reform in organization of the first schools. This reform was launched by Yehoshua ben Gamla, the High Priest.13 But schools in Yehoshua ben Gamla’s time were only for boys (it is worth noting that, in Athens, the situation was similar, whereas in Sparta, girls did attend school).

When did the first Jewish school for Jewish girls come into existence? The answer is surprising: The year was 1917, thousands of years after schools were first provided for boys. Beit Ya’akov was the first Jewish school for girls. Beit Ya’akov schools continue to this day and do not strike us as out of the ordinary or unusual. But founding Beit Ya’akov was not simple. Natural conservatism and the precedent of the Reform movement made it necessary for Sarah Schnirer, founder of Beit Ya’akov, to seek approval of her generation’s leaders—the Hafetz Haim and the Gerer Rebbe. Even with their approval, her school had a very slow start. Subsequently, however, the school “exploded” into a movement that comprised several hundred institutions throughout Poland.14 Now Beit Ya’akov is widely considered part of ancient tradition, sanctified by ages and sages.

In our own time, we are witness to another quantum leap in Torah learning for women. Many young women devote a year or more to Torah studies immediately after high school before engaging in national service or serving in the Israeli army, women have studied Jewish law and qualified as advocates in rabbinic courts (to’anot rabbaniyot). There is even a military yeshiva for women in Jerusalem!

Torah Reading in the Synagogue

Another issue related to Torah study is whether women may be called to read the Torah in the synagogue. The starting point in this discussion is the talmudic dictum, “Everyone may read, but a woman should not, out of respect for the community.”15 The theoretical permissibility for women to read actually made its way to the codes, and such readings have indeed occurred on a number of occasions.16

A fascinating discussion of this issue recently appeared on the pages of Edah magazine. The first salvo was fired in an article by Rabbi M. Shapiro.17 Subsequently, responses were penned by Rabbi Y. H. Henkin18 and by Professor D. Sperber.19

From the discussion, it develops that the central issue is not modesty, which is not mentioned at all in the relevant talmudic passage.15 All three authors attempt to explain what about a woman’s reading the Torah in the synagogue was considered disrespectful to the community. The most likely explanation is that should a woman read, it might be inferred that the men of the community are incapable.

What might be the validity of this consideration in our time? At one time, each person called to the Torah (aliyah) read the Torah on his own. Today, however, there is a designated reader and the person called merely recites the blessings before and after the reading. Under such circumstances, if a woman is called, there will be no inference that the men of the community are incapable—there is hardly anyone incapable of reciting the blessings, and no one except the designated reader is expected to read directly from the Torah itself. Moreover, a solution that would eliminate all doubts of this type has already been proposed: if all the men of a given congregation were to sign a waiver (shtar vitur) in which they declare that they will take no offense should a woman be called, the law’s concern for their respect should be effectively waived. In fact, this author has tried (without success) to obtain such a document from Rabbi Shapiro.

The bottom line of this discussion was that, in our time, women could indeed be called to the Torah, especially on occasions, such as Simhat Torah when the usual order of reading is altered and, in most synagogues, multiple readings take place. The main problem remaining, however, is that of the slippery slope: If women are called to the Torah, who can imagine what will develop? Women reading from the Torah are just a small step away from Reform Judaism! And, of course, there is the old standby, What will people say? As Rabbi Y. H. Henkin expresses it (with a bit more sophistication), “Women’s aliyot remain outside the consensus, and a congregation that institutes them is not Orthodox in name and will not remain Orthodox in practice.”

In response to such claims as the slippery slope we suggest bearing in mind the Talmud’s remark that prophecy died with the destruction of the Temple—today, no one can foresee the future. As to consensus, well consensus is hardly constant. Politicians try all the time to change consensus, and sometimes they even succeed.

Today there is also interest in calling women to the Torah in special women’s services. This took place, for example, in the Ma’ale Adumim suburb, Mitzpe Navo, on Simhat Torah 2003. From the discussion in Edah magazine, it the practice of reading the Torah in the synagogue is not derived from the obligation to study Torah but rather from the obligation of hakhel (special public Torah reading held once in seven years in Jerusalem when the Temple was standing). Unlike the obligation to study Torah, the obligation of hakhel does not exclude women. In this light it is interesting to note that the practice of having four aliyot on Rosh Hodesh—an addition of one aliyah over weekdays—is justified on the basis that work does not suffer. On Rosh Hodesh, the Talmud explains, women do not work!20 Thus, at least in theory, women seem to be very much part of Torah reading in the synagogue.

Some have gone further, trying to build a more egalitarian synagogue altogether. An example is the Shirah Hadashah congregation in Jerusalem. At Shirah Hadashah, not only are women called to the Torah, the service does not start until there is a quorum of 10 men and 10 women!21 Part of that congregation’s justification for continually pushing the cutting edge of women’s equality in the synagogue is its members’ intention to drag the “center”—the consensus, if you will—incrementally in the direction of greater equality.

Case Study 1—The Story of M

Here is a true story, without names. Throughout this story, we use the following notation:

M = A particular man—our protagonist

W = A particular woman

RS = The rabbi of the synagogue in question

RY = The rabbi of a particular yeshiva

RT = The rabbi of the town

Let us proceed:
M is a man who takes equality seriously. He worships in a congregation whose members are generally rather modern and open-minded; it is the congregation where RS is the rabbi. On Friday evenings various members deliver sermons on a rotating basis, and M felt it important that a woman be permitted to speak. From RY, M received an opinion that, with some technical qualifications, this would be permissible. However, M found it difficult to find a woman to speak. Not that women have nothing to offer in this context, on the contrary, they have much to contribute. Nevertheless, it was difficult to find a woman willing to break with precedent in that synagogue, even though women do speak in other synagogues.

Finally, after much hesitation, W agreed to speak. At this point the person responsible for the selecting speakers and RS decided to consult with RT, who rejected the whole idea out of hand.

In response, M himself delivered a harsh sermon about conformism among the reputedly open-minded. In response to M’s sermon, RS spoke publicly, bravely accepting all responsibility for this uncomfortable situation and asserting that all of M’s rebukes should have targeted him. Nevertheless, RS explained, he considered relations with RT more important than the struggle for equality as expressed in having a woman deliver a sermon.

At this point, M undertook to speak with RT and respectfully expressed his disagreement with RT’s ruling. RT did not cite any legal source for his ruling but rather declared that Orthodox Judaism finds itself in great danger owing to a multitude of factors—one of them being the increasing equality of men and women—and that this situation obligates us to exercise great caution. Lest the Orthodoxy—Humpty Dumpty-like—have a great fall.

Thus, the problem, it seems, was not Jewish law at all but rather one man’s view of the world and its future.

In response, M delivered another sermon expressing even more bitterness and dissatisfaction.

And there the matter lies to this day.

Case Study 2—Purim in Talmon

A recent example of resistance to change is the article published by Rabbi Shlomo Aviner shortly before Purim 2004.22 The women of Talmon had asked their local rabbi, Rabbi Rami Berahiahu for permission to convene a women’s service in which women would read the Megilla. Rabbi Berahiahu permitted this, prompting Rabbi Aviner to record several revealing objections:

“One must not change any order of prayer; those that represent thousands of years of practice are very good…”

“Are those customs that have been kept by generations not good? Do we want to revolt against them?”

“It is forbidden to seek new ways to serve the Almighty.”

In essence, what we have here is conservative Judaism with a small c—the fewer changes the better. In his response to Rabbi Aviner, Rabbi Berahiahu explains that there was no revolt but rather a respectful request. Some changes, Rabbi Berahiahu asserts, may be for the better.

And the Megilla was read by women for women—another small step in overcoming the curse of Eve.

How Is All This Related to NDS?

Anyone who works at NDS and attends synagogue cannot help but feeling dissonance. At NDS, no one would dare discriminate against women. Their rights are proclaimed equal and kept equal. No one would limit a woman’s right to free speech. The administration keeps a watch on equality, protects employees from harassment, and maintains other conditions important for a good atmosphere at work. Merit is proclaimed the single valid criterion for evaluation.

At the synagogue, by contrast, women rarely have any chance at all to glimpse the inside of a Torah scroll. They often cannot hear what is said and are rarely given an opportunity to say something themselves. In some places, attempts to seat a woman on the synagogue council are met with strong resistance from the religious establishment, even though part of the obligation to have a public Torah reading falls on women, given that they too are subject to the obligation of hakhel. Women may also want to express their opinions on architecture, acoustics, and the like.

A natural question may be asked, Where is the situation better? Is the ideal achieved in the synagogue, where women are strictly limited so as to avoid interfering with men’s free expression of their spirituality? Is the environment we know at NDS simply a compromise because nowadays (be’avonoteinu) the workplace just cannot be organized any other way? Or, conversely, is the work environment a good model, providing, as it does, conditions for concentration no less than the synagogue while granting both sexes creative expression? Is the order of things in the synagogue simply a relic of times gone by (never to return)?

The answers to these questions, dear reader, we leave to you.

Why Are People Against Greater Equality in the Synagogue?

Why, indeed, are people against greater equality in the synagogue? An informal survey came up with several explanations:

a)      People adhere to their own understanding of Halakhah.

b)      People really do believe that women are somehow inferior, but they keep this opinion to themselves.

c)      People are afraid to change anything, because change implies that something was wrong.

d)      People are afraid of all change, because change can lead too far.

e)      People avoid change for fear of embarking on the path of Reform Judaism.

In our humble opinion, of all these considerations, only (a) has weight. Nonetheless, many people go straight to the other considerations, not grounding their views in Halakhah. Consideration (b) is not serious, and (c) is a bit funny, because it would have prevented any positive change at all (e.g., Hillel’s prozbul). As to (d) and (e), we would respond that if change is carried out within the framework of Halakhah there is no real danger.

Of particular relevance to (e) is Rabbi Aharon Soloveitchik’s reasoning in permitting women to recite Kaddish:23 “Today, when Jews are battling over equality between men and women with respect to such matters as aliyot, if Orthodox rabbis bar women from saying Kaddish, despite the possibility of permitting it, the influence of Reform and Conservative rabbis will thereby be strengthened. Accordingly, it is forbidden to bar women from saying Kaddish.” According to Rabbi Soloveitchik, then, intensive struggle against equality may actually play into the hands of the Reform movement!

But Who Cares?

Now some readers may ask, “OK, but why is it so important?” In response, we bring several answers:

a)      Even as we try to relieve people from hard labor and rescue them from death, we must struggle against all oppression. So, must we detect situations that have been taken for granted but are in reality consequences of ancient inequality. Having detected such things, we must endeavor to eliminate them.

b)      We shall all gain if all creative talents are allowed to express themselves. How many authors and researchers like Nehama Leibovitch of blessed memory have been lost because of limitations placed on women?!  And some of these limitations are still with us—today, Nehama herself would be allowed to write but still not to speak in the synagogue.

c)      We are not living in a vacuum; there is strong competition between countries, ideologies, and religions. To be successful, we must use all our resources. And half of our human resources are women! So, to be successful we must allow both men and women to use their talents on an equal basis within Judaism as they do in other spheres.

d)      The Talmud permits women to perform smikhah (part of the sacrificial rite) “in order to please them.24” Thus Temple practice was changed in order to make persons feel happy. If so, why do we not do the same whenever possible? We want to be good to people, don’t we?

e)      There is a strong feeling of cognitive dissonance, when we see the status of women so different in two good places. For the sake of mental balance, this dissonance needs to be eliminated.

Closing remarks

In our humble opinion, the time is ripe for further improvement in the status of women. We had better do it now, before we are forced to once more souls have been lost.

Moreover it is our moral duty.

 

 

Acknowledgements

The author owes some ideas to his wife Miriam, who also brought to his attention the similarity between the two verses analogy and proposed several explanations, and to his brother-in-law Dmitry Sheinin and Chaim Mayerson for editing.



1 Genesis 3:16 (all biblical citations are from the Jewish Publication Society’s 1917 translation (www.breslov.com/bible).

2 Genesis 4:7.

3 Genesis 3:17.

4 Genesis 5:29. Rashi says that agriculture was made easier by new technologies—the plough was invented.

5 See Lamentations, 3:39.

6 From Da’at Hamikra on Genesis 4:7.

7 Mishnah Ketubot 5:7 as explained by the Gemara (Ketubot 64b) supposes that man’s desire is stronger than woman’s that man suffers more severely from deprivation of intimacy. See there for proof and the practical, legal consequences.

8 The plain meaning of the Psalms 45:14 is a description of a glorious wedding ceremony. Also Megilla 14b, and Yoma 66b.

9 Napoleon’s phrase, “Women’s business is knitting.” There exists a whole spectrum of maxims, ranging from demands for modesty in dress through injunctions that women know their (i.e., subservient) place, to blunt declarations of women’s inferiority.

10 Lev Tolstoy, Kreutzer Sonata, chapter 9, translated by Benjamin R. Tucker.

11 Mishnah Sota 3:4, Gemara 20a. See also Maimonides, Hilchot Talmud Torah 1:13.

12 Recently we learned that it was the French philosopher Condorocet who first spoke of equal rights for women in 1787. After the French Revolution, the women’s leader Olympe de Gouges published a pamphlet on equal rights for women. In spite of active participation of women in the revolution, no rights were granted to them, and the leader was beheaded in 1783 (from Sophie’s World by Jostein Gaarder, chapter “Enlightenment”).

13 Baba Batra 21a. See also Rachel Yeshurun’s article in Hidushei Torah@NDS,vol. IV.

15 Megilla 23a and Tosefta Megilla 3:11.

16 Shulhan Arukh, Orah Haim 282:3

17 Rabbi Mendel Shapiro, “Qer’iat h-Torah by Women. Halachic Analyis,” http://www.edah.org/backend/JournalArticle/1_2_shapiro.pdf. I am grateful to Yitzhak Zuriel for this reference.

18 Rabbi Yehuda Herzl Henkin, “Qeri’at Ha-Torah by Women: Where We Stand Today,”http://www.edah.org/backend/coldfusion/displayissue.cfm?volume=1&isssue=2.

19 Professor Daniel Sperber, “Congregational Dignity and Human Dignity: Women and Public Torah Reading,”http://www.edah.org/backend/coldfusion/displayissue.cfm?volume=3&issue=2.

20 Megilla 22b.

21 Shoshi Grinfeld, “HeHazan Hayah Blondinit” (Hebrew), Nekuda #267, December 2003, pp. 40–47.

22 Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, “From Whom to Hear Megilla,” Hatzofeh, 20 February 2004.

23 Cited by Professor Daniel Sperber, op. cit.: Od Yosef Beni Hai (Brisk Yeshiva, 1993), section 32, p. 100 and note 31.

24 Hagiga 16b.

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